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ABSTRACT
Climate Change has become a Major issue beginning with our generation. Governments
the world over are now recognizing that industry cannot continue to pollute in a business-
as-usual manner. Emitting Greenhouse gases has a global impact, unlike pollutants that
are released into soil or water. Global warming created by the Greenhouse effect,
amongst other things is causing an increase in the ambient global temperature, causing
glaciers to melt and global weather patterns to change. At the same time the world
population is increasing, the standard of living for an increasing percentage of the
population is improving, and with that the global energy usage is going up and up.
Currently, a large portion of the global energy is derived from fossil fuels. Combusting
fossil fuels are the primary source of Greenhouse gas emissions. The challenge for
governments then is two-fold. One is how to cap and/or reduce the Greenhouse gases
from industry, and second, how to achieve this first goal without being detrimental to the
industry in a large way, or as some say with the least cost. In the USA, due to lack of a
federal standard, several states have either banded together or gone it alone, in defining
their own attempt to address the Greenhouse gas problem. The state of California is one
such state that has put together a committee of experts, to advise the state on how best to
design a system with the two afore-said challenges in mind. A model has been put
together to model Option A, Program Design 1 of the California Cap-and-Trade system.
The goal of the model is to give the regulator an understanding of how by varying the
main lever, which is the cap set, the regulator can influence the covered Electric entities
in optimally meeting the cap, based on the headroom they have for abatement, and their
actual ability to act and the degree to which they can act in abatement; and secondly how
this main lever, can create a thriving market for trading allowances, by trying to have
almost an equal number of players that want to buy the requisite number of allowances to
meet the cap, or sell their excess allowances.
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Chapter 1 : Introduction
"To live is to pollute " (Dales 1968). Men take from the environment, a wide variety of
vegetable, mineral and animal materials; transform them into a very much wider variety
of economic goods; consume these goods, a process during which these goods undergo
physical or chemical transformations, and become, in effect, garbage; then discard this
garbage into the environment, i.e. air, soil and water. In addition, unwanted materials, in
solid, liquid or gaseous states, that are generated during the transformation phase, also
called the production phase, are discarded into the environment. Hence pollution occurs
at two points, at transformation and at consumption (Dales 1968).
The amount of pollution produced is dictated by the standard of living of the society.
Higher the standard of living, the higher the consumption rate and larger the
transformation processes, therefore proportionally increasing pollution. Since all
societies, not just the US and the Western countries are interested in improving their
standard of living, it is only correct to assume that the rate and level of pollution is only
going to go up. On the other hand, the amount of pollution reduced depends on
improvements in efficiencies of production, thereby reducing the amount of pollution
produced per unit of good produced. The amount of waste recycling done by society,
therefore proportionally decreasing pollution, and the natural processes occurring in
nature, that "bio-degrade" the pollutants, garbage or waste (Dales 1968).
Pollution harm depends less on the pollutant itself, but more on the properties of the
pollutant. If the pollutant can easily be re-cycled by man, the pollutant does not
accumulate and its harmful effect minimized. If the pollutant is easily re-cycled by
nature, the pollutants are less likely to accumulate, and its harmful effect is minimized.
While pollution may be harmful, it also has a benefit; an economic benefit.
When a leather factory, discharges its effluents in a stream, it presumably is adopting the
cheapest method of disposing off its unwanted wastes. This activity translates directly
into dollars saved, and hence lower prices to its customers. However, losses or damages
may be felt by those downstream; farmers, using the water for farming, or fisherman,
using the stream for fishing. In other words, if the accumulation of pollutants is not large
enough that it produces a benefit, without causing damages or losses that exceed the
benefits, the pollutants are not a problem, and hence there is no pollution problem.
Conversely if the harm done by disposing a particular waste in a particular way,
outweighs the benefits associated with that practice, then a pollution problem occurs
(Dales 1968).
Pollution control can be then surmised as that can be controlled at the production process,
by increasing efficiencies, so as to reduce the amount of pollution produced, and, that
which can be controlled, once produced, by natural or man-made recycling processes.
We assume the cost of recycling by nature is beneficial in most cases, but for our context
we assume that it is free. Hence the real cost of pollution, to a producer is the sum of the
costs of pollution prevention and costs of pollution cleanup, which can be summed up as
the following equation (Dales 1968).
Waste disposal Costs = Pollution Prevention Costs + Pollution Costs ... Equation 1
Pollution Costs, can be thought of as the aggregate of public expenditure, private
expenditure and welfare damage to individuals, and can be written as the following
equation (Dales 1968).
Pollution Costs = Public Expenditures to avoid Pollution Damage + Private Expenditures to
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Figure 1 : Main Categories of emissions by sources and removal by sinks
To control pollution then would be to internalize the externality, i.e. the firm's actions
that impose costs on others. Regulators rushed to enact legal rules that force the firm to
bear the external cost to it; to internalize the externality. The net cost now equals the net
cost to everyone, and the firm's action will be based on its net benefit.
The first such approach was of Direct Regulation. A government agency such as the EPA
makes rules mandating use of particular solutions. For example, the EPA may make rules
requiring steel mills to filter their smoke and build high smoke stacks. While this is an
obvious solution it has serious problems. The first is that the EPA may not be interested
in maximizing efficiency, since the EPA itself is controlled by politicians. The interests
of the controlling politicians and the EPA may not be in alignment. The second issue is
that even if the EPA wants to maximize efficiency, it does not know how to do it.
Figuring out what pollution control measures are or are not worth taking, and how much
steel ought to be produced after properly allowing for external costs of producing it are
hard problems that the EPA is not equipped to handle (Friedman 2000). A third issue,
offered by Gordon Tullock and Nobel Laureate James Buchanan, is that direct regulation
takes away the property rights of those affected by pollution. This type of regulation
represents an output restriction, i.e. the total amount of goods produced by a particular
industry is reduced. If such an output restriction is mandated by government fiat, the
price will rise as if the industry had formed a cartel. Essentially the result is an industry
cartel managed and enforced by the policing power of the pollution control authority.
Finally polluters can reap residual profits if the price increase exceeds the associated
increase in cost incurred by pollution control capital expenditures (Yandle 1999).
A second type of regulatory approach was an indirect regulation. Instead of telling a firm
specifically what to do, instead the regulator simply charges the firm for its pollution.
This approach labeled "effluent fees", generally known as "Pigouvian taxes" has several
advantages over direct regulation. To begin with, the regulator does not have to know
anything about the costs of pollution control; he/she can safely leave that to the firm. If
the firm can reduce its emissions at a cost less than the fee, it will do so, else pay the fee,
giving the firm a choice. A second advantage is that this approach generates not only the
right amount of pollution control but the right amount of product as well. Since the cost
of the negative externality is embedded in the price of the product produced, how much
of the product produced depends on how competitive this product is versus its competing
product also sold at the true cost. Unfortunately, "effluent fees" do not solve all of the
problems of controlling pollution. For one thing they do not solve the problem of making
it in the political interest of the regulators to do the right thing. Fees could be set low to
reward firms contributing to the political campaign, or set too high to punish firms
contributing to the wrong candidate. Even if the regulators are trying to produce an
efficient outcome, it may not be easy to measure the damage actually done by each
additional pound of pollutant, and therefore the size of the penalty. However, while the
political issues, as in the case of direct regulation still exists, they are reduced, since it is
harder to provide special favors to your friends, when the decisions are made pollutant by
pollutant, instead of firm by firm (Friedman 2000).
A third approach resorted to Tort law. Instead of having the regulators impose taxes,
people are permitted to sue the firm for the damage its pollution is doing to themselves
and their property. The firm now has the choice of eliminating the pollution, paying
damages, or reducing the pollution and paying damages on what is left. There is a
difference though. Effluent fees and fines go to the state, Tort damages go to the victim
and his/her attorney.
The first two approaches are part of a command-and-control regulatory system.
A fourth approach was suggested by Ronald Coase. Coase debunked the then popular
Pigouvian notion in three ways. First that existence of externalities does not necessarily
lead to inefficient results. Second, Pigouvian taxes do not in general lead to an efficient
result, and Third, and most important, the problem is not really externalities at all; it is
transaction costs.
According to Coase, an external cost is not simply a cost produced by one person and
borne by another. In almost all cases, the existence and size of external costs depend on
decisions by both parties. If this is true then a legal rule that assigns blame to one of the
parties gives the right result only if that party happens to be the one who can avoid the
problem at the lower cost, or if the optimal solution requires precautions by both parties.
The next step in Coase's argument is that, as long as the parties can readily make and
enforce contracts in their mutual interest, direct regulation nor a Piguovian tax is
necessary in order to get an efficient outcome. This is because rights, pollution or
otherwise, will be negotiated and move to those to whom they are of greatest value,
giving an efficient outcome(Friedman 2000). (See Coase's thereom in Appendix)
But what happens if one party consists of a single or small number of entities and the
othe party happens to be a large number of entities. In this case transaction costs are high.
Hence when we observe externality problems (or other forms of market failure) in the
real world, we should ask not merely where the problem comes from but what the
transaction cost is that prevents it from being bargained out of existence.(Friedman 2000)
In effect Coase suggests a market solution, rather than a regulatory solution. The Cap-
and-Trade system is one such system that internalizes the externalities, but at the lowest
cost to the entities. The amount of pollution (stock) can be construed as a proxy for the
cost of damage by the externality.
Chapter 2 : Background
Policy Instruments
Several types of policy instruments are available to address pollution control. Some of
them are, the creation of well defined property rights, tradable permits, emission charges,
user fees, subsidies, technology standards, emission standards, bans, quotas, provision of
information, labeling, imposition of technology standards, and the provision of
infrastructure or other public goods (Sterner 2003). The most important criterion for
designing policy instruments is welfare maximization, while keeping in mind the serious
economic consequences such as higher costs of production to a firm as well as increased
energy prices to the consumer. Economics mixes with politics, and as a practical matter it
is easier to focus on sub goals such as efficiency, incentive compatibility and equity. A
mix and match of the above instruments could be tailored to a specific application
creating a complex pollution control system. In the case of the Greenhouse gas
containment, the two most commonly used systems of instruments are the command-and-
control system, a system where a regulation is passed and enforced; and the Cap-and-
Trade system, a market based emissions trading system.
Emissions Trading
There are three types of emissions trading. Credit based, Allowance based and a variant
of credit-based called Averaging (Ellerman, Joskow et al. 2003). In a credit-based
system, an entity creates credits by reducing its emissions more than the specified
standard. These credits can be transferred to another entity, allowing that entity to have
emissions above the standard. However, creating the credits and transferring them are
decided by the regulator. Not so in the case of Allowance based trading. Tradable rights
to emit (allowances) are created initially, and then distributed according to some scheme.
There is no presumption that the entity will limit its emissions to the allowances that it
receives. These allowances can be traded. The only restriction is that allowances covering
the emissions must be surrendered at the end of every compliance period. The Averaging
based system is similar to the credit based system, in the way credits are created. Except
in the Averaging case, similar to the allowance based system, regulatory approval is not
required to trade (Ellerman, Joskow et al. 2003).
Cap-and-Trade system
Allowance based emission programs are called Cap-and-Trade systems. Tradable
allowances, representing the right to emit one metric ton of C02 equivalent, equal in total
to the annual allowed emissions of the entities covered by the Cap-and-Trade system, are
created. Allowances equal to, using some method as, average emissions over the last
three to four years, are allocated for free to each entity on a pro-rated basis. A portion of
the allowances approximately 3%-5% of the allocated allowances to each entity is
withheld. These withheld allowances are then auctioned off annually, and can be traded
between entities. At the end of the compliance period, each entity is required to surrender
one tradable allowance for each ton of C02 equivalent emitted.
Banking
Allowances which are not used (surrendered) are allowed to be carried over to the next
year, i.e. banked, for future use, either by the original entity or by another entity
purchasing the tradable allowance. Banking is necessary. If investments in abatement
costs result in reduced emissions, the entity will hold on to more of its allowances.
However if these allowances expire at the end of the compliance period, the incentive to
invest in abatement costs is reduced. All of the US emissions trading programs, except
the RECLAIM program have included banking. These programs have shown that by
including banking two positive results are achieved. The first, banking can lead to
significant 'early action' when coupled with phased-in emission reduction requirements
and second, that banking can dampen the volatility of allowance prices (Ellerman,
Joskow et al. 2003).
Distribution
Allocations of allowances thus far have been allocated without charge to participants.
What makes this allocation method attractive in positive political economy terms, i,e. the
conveyance of scarcity rents to the private sector, makes allocation without charge
problematic, in normative efficiency terms (Fullerton and Metcalf 2001). For example, in
the case of SO2 allowance trading, costs of allowance trading would have dropped an
additional 25% had allowances been auctioned off, rather than given away; since the
revenues received could be used to finance reductions in pre-existing distortionary taxes
(Goulder, Parry et al. 1996). Another issue is the post-trading equilibrium obtained in the
presence of transaction costs, implying that aggregate abatement costs are sensitive to the
initial permit allocation (Stavins and John 1994).
Safety Valve
Not all emission programs have worked out as well. For e.g. in the RECLAIM market the
NOx allowances that traded in the range from $1000 to $3000, worked well until the
electricity problem. The NOx allowances traded for as high as $80,000 before the system
broke down (Jacoby and Ellerman 2004). The solution adopted by the state of California
was to introduce a mitigation fee of $15,000 per ton instead of buying an allowance. The
effect of the mitigation fee was to reduce the volatility of the allowance prices, and
served as a safety valve. Safety valves are important to protect the system from major
shocks.
One way to implement a safety valve would be to combine price and quantity policies.
The quantity policy would establish binding emissions target, so long as the costs remain
reasonable. The emissions target would be allowed to rise if prices became unreasonable,
the price policy would kick in, with additional allowances being made available at a fixed
trigger price.
Market Creation
In the Cap-and-Trade system, similar to the Averaging system, and unlike the Credit
based system, the entity is no longer bound by the regulators abatement decision
(Ellerman, Joskow et al. 2003). Instead the entity is in control of the abatement decision
and it is free to decide how the abatement should be carried out, within the constraint of
the cap. The entity, based on costs, could either decide to indulge in abatement itself, or
trade away its abatement responsibility. Decentralizing the abatement decision and letting
entities trade abatement responsibilities in this manner allows the emergence of a market
for allowances. For entities facing relatively high abatement costs, a functioning market
significantly reduces the cost of finding trading partners resulting in a more efficient
solution (Ellerman, Joskow et al. 2003).
Abatement Technology
Porter hypothizes, also called 'Porter's Hypothesis' that strict environmental regulation
triggers the discovery of cleaner technologies and environmental improvements, making
production processes and products more efficient. Porter hypothizes that the cost savings
that can be achieved are sufficiently large to cover both the innovation costs and the
compliance costs (Roediger-Schluga 2004).
California Pollution Pie
The pollution pie below shows the contribution of carbon emissions by industrial sectors,
using fossil fuel. Clearly Electricity and transportation are the two main sectors to be
addressed.
California's Gross GHG Emissions in 2004














Figure 2 : California Greenhouse Gas pollution pie
Note : The following section is gleaned from the document
"Recommendations for Designing a Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-Trade
System for California" - Recommendations of the Market Advisory
Committee to the California Air Resources Board - June 30, 2007.
Introduction
The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (Act) requires that the State of
California dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions by year 2020. Specifically this
forward looking statute charges the California Air Resources Board (CARB) with
responsibility for overseeing the development and implementation of such a plan.
The Act recognizes that a market based system can be used in conjunction with
regulatory and other strategies to meet an economy wide emissions reduction target.
In support of the Act, Governor Amold Schwarzenegger directed the Secretary for
Environmental protection to create a Market Advisory Committee (MAC) to advise
CARB regarding the development of the greenhouse reduction plan for California. The
Committee is composed of national and international experts who have backgrounds in
economics, environmental policy, regulatory affairs and energy technologies.
Stringency of the Cap
The breadth of coverage and the quantity of emissions are closely related to each other.
The narrow the coverage the fewer the entities covered and broader the coverage the
larger the entities covered, which impact the setting of the cap in terms of quantity of
emissions. The cap level is set above current emissions levels, allowing for emissions
growth at first, but below 'business-as-usual'. The cap then is gradually declined, in
frequent smaller step reductions, to return emissions to 1990 levels in year 2020. The
benefit is that firms will be able phase in new emission reductions continuously and have
a less impact on price volatility. The cap level is absolute, in the sense that it is not
affected by change in GDP, shifts in production or control technology. As far as the
impact of direct regulation, any gains made in reduction of emissions by entities outside
the cap, can be used to increase the cap. Not so for covered entities.
Mandatory reporting to the California Climate Action Registry is expected from all
covered entities.
Program Scope
A broad program scope yields additional opportunities for low-cost mitigation. It
promotes greater market liquidity by increasing the number of entities involved in
trading. It prevents any one entity or group of entities from hoarding and exercising
market power. If covered entities cannot have their emissions monitored, reported and
verified to a high degree of accuracy, then the breadth of the program should be limited,
and not cover these entities with unreliable emission information. Similarly if transaction
costs are particularly high for some entities, then these entities could be excluded from
the program. Coverage can expand over time as these difficulties are overcome.
An allowance for Greenhouse gas emissions is defined in terms of the mass of C02
equivalent, and is derived in two ways. Allowances defined in terms of actual emissions,
and allowances defined in terms of a proxy for actual emissions. Under the second
approach, the purchase or sale of a chemical or fuel, where the quantity of chemical or
fuel bears a clear relationship to eventual GHG emissions, is used as a proxy for actual
emissions. Which of the two method's to use, to define allowances, depends on the
decisions concerning the 'point of regulation', i.e. which entities will be required to hold
allowances authorizing their emissions or uses of fuels/chemicals, under the program. To
pinpoint the 'point of regulation', the diverse emission sources (entities), of non-C02
emissions, can be grouped into one of four categories.
1. Combustion emissions of CH4 and N20
2. Industrial processes and product uses
3. Fugitive emissions of Methane, and
4. Biological processes
The MAC put forth four program designs, which define the scope and point of regulation
of a Cap-and-Trade program, beginning with the least comprehensive to more
comprehensive ones. The following figure (Fig 3.) facilitates the comparison between the
four program designs.
Uses of Fossil Carbon and Fossil Carbon-Based Products
In the California Economy
"upstream" "downstream"
natural gas processors











- -- --- generation
---- 








Figure 3 : Uses of Fossil Carbon and Fossil Carbon based products in the California economy
The above figure shows the two ways in which carbon enters the California economy,
through production and through import, of two fossil fuels namely, crude petroleum and











Program 1 - Coverage of Medium and Large point sources of Emissions, and of
Some Suppliers of High-GWP Gases; Coverage at point of Combustion:
* Scope: This program covers medium and large GHG emitting entities, for
example, electric power plants or energy intensive industries, such as refining and
cement production. It includes industrial process emissions (as opposed to
combustion emissions) of C02. It also includes N20 emissions from Nitric Acid
production as well as the production or import of fluorinated gases.
* Points of regulation: Points el and e2 in Fig 3.
* Extent of coverage: Includes approximately 39% of California's GHG emissions
and covers approximately 450 medium and large facilities.
* Administrative considerations: The administrative requirements are very similar
to established programs such as the US acid rain program, the NOX program, the
EU ETS and the Northeast RGGI program. This program requires very little new
infrastructure to track C02 emissions, since these are currently already being
reported. The only additional infrastructure required will be that which is required
to capture data on electricity imports and high GWP gases.
* Implementation: Program 1 could be implemented now. It is consistent with many
of the current Cap-and-Trade systems. Data on hourly C02 emissions from all
power plants is currently available. Techniques for measuring and reporting the
other covered entities are available.
Fig 4 below summarizes the emissions coverage and the number of entities that would
need to be covered with the above four program designs.
Contributions of Different Programs to California Emissions Reductions
Year 2004 Emissions Percentage Contribution to AB32
Estimated Number of under These Points of Emissions Reduction Target if Cap
Program Points of Regulation' Regulation2  Requires Reduction of'...
% of state
tons total 10% 20% 30% 40%
1 450 192.6 39 13 27 40 54
2 480 355.9 72 25 50 74 99
3 490 408.8 83 29 57 86 114
4 150"  408.8 83 29 57 86 114
The number of points of regulation listed is an estimate and excludes an indefinrte number of small facilities
responsible for emissions of high GWP gases. It also excludes the agents (LSEs and various electricity
wholesalers) responsible for embodied emissions in imported electricity.
; Baseline 2004 emissions include CO2 embodied in imported electricity and exclude land use and forestry
changes and international bunker fuels Units are million metric tons of C02 equivalent. The state total in
2004 was 494.3.
- Assuming 2020 business as usual emissions of 608.1 and 1990 emissions 29% below that level (implying a
need to reduce emissions by 176.3 million tons). Also assumes proportional increases of emissions from all
sources.
4 An interstate or intrastate pipeline wil! often transport gas on behalf of several entities - businesses that take
delivery of gas via the pipeline for purposes of direct consunmption or subsequent sale in California. For
Program 4, the estimated number of points of regulation includes approximately 100 business entities that take
delivery and assume ownership of natural gas in connection with pipeline transport
Additional Notes.
- These values are based on two sets of data received from the ARB: the revised 2004 inventory and a list of
emissions of C02 from sources over 10~000 tons in 2004.
- In every program, the cap-and-trade program is assumed to cover all process and high GWP emissions(4.2% of 2004 GHG emissions) and to cover C02 emissions embodied in imported electricity (12.3% of 2004
GHG emissions).
Figure 4 : Summary of achievable emissions coverage with number of covered facilities
The columns on the right side represent the percentage contribution of emission
reductions by the covered entities for a state mandated reduction percentage.
For example, if the state mandated reductions was set to 20% with Program 3 in place.
Then the covered entities would provide 57% of the emission reduction, with the other
43% having to come from non-covered entities. Numerically, the BAU (Business As
Usual) amount in year 2020 would be 600.8 MMT (Million Metric Tons). The 1990
levels are reported to be 426.6 MMT. Hence the required reduction is the difference of
174.2 MMT. The covered entities in Program 3 would provide a reduction of 99.3 MMT
(57%), whereas the uncovered sources would have to provide a reduction of the balance
74.9 MMT (43%). But the baseline emissions outside the Cap-and-Trade are just 17%
(100%-83%) or 102.1MMT. Dividing 74.9 MMT by 102.1 MMT implies that the
uncovered entities must undergo a 73% reduction in their GHG emissions. This is
unrealistic and suggests that the Cap-and-Trade program must significantly increase the
emission reductions to well over 20%.
The Market Advisory Committee fully agreed that the Cap-and-Trade system should
work towards comprehensive coverage and focused on two ways to achieve this
objective.
They created two options from the four program designs.
Option A, was to start with Program 1 immediately, then expand to Program 2 as data
became available and administrative requirements were met. Subsequently the Cap-and-
Trade program would evolve to Program 3, as data and administrative requirements of
Program 3 were met.
Option B, entailed beginning Program 4 only after the data and administrative
requirements pertinent to Program 4 were established. This would happen later than
sooner.
Issues Specific to the Electricity sector
The Electricity sector accounts for approximately 22% (2006) of California's Greenhouse
emissions, half of which is from electricity imported from outside the state.
For the Cap-and-Trade system to be effective, it has to address the serious problem of
potential emissions 'leakage' associated with electricity imports. To prevent this potential
emissions 'leakage', imported electricity must be brought within the sphere of the Cap-
and-Trade system. If not, the bias will be towards less of in-state generation and more of
imports to circumvent the additional cost of in-state Cap-and-Trade system compliance.
Clearly this would contradict the spirit and letter of the Global Warming Solutions Act as
well as the guiding principles enunciated by the MAC committee. (The Global Warming
Solutions Act, aims to reduce emissions associated with the state's consumption, and not
just generation of electricity.) Several methods can be employed in the design of the Cap-
and-Trade system to control potential emissions leakage.
The Market Advisory Committee has highlighted two methods. The first is a 'load-based'
approach, in which the obligation for compliance rests with the LSE. A LSE (see
appendix) is not only an investor owned utility that the PUC regulates, but also includes
municipal utilities, co-ops, and other entities that serve customer electricity load. The
second method is the 'first-seller' approach, in which the obligation for compliance is on
the first seller of power in the California electricity markets.
The points of regulation differ for the two methods. In the load-based approach the LSE
is the point of regulation. The LSE is responsible for accounting for emissions for
electricity consumed in the state that is made available from both imported electricity and
in-state generation. In the first-seller approach the owner/operator of the California power
plant or the importing contractual party, is the point of regulation. The importing
contractual party could be any wholesale power marketer and need not be a LSE.
Calculation of the Greenhouse gas emissions, for either of the above approaches, can be
done in two ways. Actual monitoring of generator emissions, OR, calculations based on
fuel content. Since actual monitoring of generator emissions of imported electricity is
extremely difficult due to a variety of reasons, it is a non-starter, despite the fact that
almost all of California's in-state electricity generators have a continuous (hourly)
monitoring process already installed and which reports that data to the California Energy
Commission. However if the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) which
coordinates power dispatch over the western electricity grid and encompasses eleven
entire western states and portions of three others along with British Columbia and
Alberta, Canada; were to agree on the electricity portion of California's Cap-and-Trade
program a simple generator-based monitoring approach could be used without concern
for leakage. But there is no such agreement in place.
Hence both the load-based and first-seller approaches would need to approximate
emissions for imported electricity. Imported power is assigned an emission intensity
based on California's Climate Action Registry's Power/Utility Reporting Protocol. The
Carbon intensity of in-state electric generation in California for 2004 was 7001bs of C02
per Mega Watt hour (MWh). Using the California's Emissions Inventory and electricity
consumption data from the California Energy Commission to account for imported power
brings the average emissions intensity of electricity consumed in the state to 9301bs per
MWh. Across the US, the average emission intensity of electric generation is 1,1761bs
per MWh. The above protocol identifies the power plant and the associated emissions for
about 56% of imported power, (Alvarado and Griffin 2007...To be added) with some
default intensity to be applied to the remaining 44%.
Using the calculations based on fuel content, i.e. the Carbon intensity method, the first-
seller approach would impose compliance obligation on contractors bringing power into
the state, as identified by E-tags. The load based approach places an additional step, i.e.
making the approximation between the first seller and the LSE that has the compliance
obligation. This is because a LSE could buy from several different sources. Not only is
tracking this difficult, due to various intensity values being assigned to various sellers in
various sub regions, but it could lead to imprecision too. Besides it could also lead to the
financial contract path to be imprecise. An imprecise method raises issues of
transparency, and whether reductions under a load based approach can be adequately
measured compared to an emissions and generator based cap. With the new 2008
regulation called the California Independent System Operator (ISO) Market Redesign and
Technology Upgrade (MRTU) that amongst other things, allows for the establishment of
a day-ahead market, which is likely to attract approximately 10-20% of all power on the
grid, it would make the load-based system a nightmare.
Under Program designs 1, 2 and 3 (Option A), both approaches, first seller and load
based apply directly. Under Program 4 (Option B) these approaches apply only as they
pertain to out-of-state sources of power sector emissions.
Contract Shuffling and Legal Challenges represent two other challenges that affect the
ability to control leakage. The compliance obligation of California's Cap-and-Trade
system could induce out-of-state power wholesalers to shift the assignment of existing
sources so that sources with comparatively lower emissions are assigned to the California
load, and those with higher emissions are routed to meet demand elsewhere. This
shuffling of contracts could reduce the emissions attributed to California's imports, even
though no actual reduction in emissions has taken place. The legal challenge is due to the
principal issue of whether the regulations treat in-state and out-of-state electricity in a
similar way. The rub is whether California's treatment of imported electricity is
consistent with the Interstate Commerce Clause, which prohibits discrimination in trade.
Summary Table Comparing First-Seller and Load-Based Approaches
Environmental Integrity
Ability to Control Emissions Leakage
Ability to Track Responsibility for In-State
Emissions
Implications for Consumer Prices
Similar under both approaches
First-seller approach has an advantage. Identification
of in-state source of emissions more difficult under
load-based approach.
Similar in most cases. However, price impact is muted
if allowances are allocated for free to LSEs and
regulatory agencies do not permit LSEs to pass the
opportunity cost of allowances through to customers.
Cost-Effectiveness
Ease of Administration
Ability to Promote Low-Cost Emissions
Reduction Strategies
Ability to Serve as a Model for Other Cap-
and-Trade Programs
First-seller approach has an advantage, in part
because of the potential for more accurate monitoring.
The load-based approach entails additional
administrative requirements, such as the need to track
in-state sources by time of day-
Some on Committee feel this is similar under both
approaches. Other Committee members assert that
the load-based approach may have an advantage on
the basis that the obligation to hold allowances will
produce stronger direct incentives for LSEs to pursue
low-cost emission reduction strategies.
First-seller approach may have advantage. It would
probably allow for an easier transition to a federal cap-
and-trade program, in particular, since a federal
program would likely be generator-based.
Figure 5 : Advantages and DisAdvantages of First-Seller and Load-Based Approaches
The Market Advisory Committee has also recommended that the following three issues
should be paid attention to.
The first is that the Cap-and-Trade system, as applied to the Electricity sector has to
demonstrate that it is actually achieving the stated emission reductions. The key areas of
concern here are, ensuring the data quality of out-of-state generators serving California
load, attributing emissions from both in- and out-of-state generators to specific LSE's,
and managing the degree to which contract shuffling reduces actual emissions reductions
under the program.
Related to the first, the second issue relates to ensuring that the provisions designed to
discourage contract shuffling or to track emissions from imports do not interfere with
current trading of short-run and real-time electricity markets.
The third issue regards multi-jurisdictional utilities and independent power producers;
they have to be treated equitably.
Electricity pricing to consumers is based on average cost of servicing customers. LSE's
including investor-owned utilities and municipal utilities operate under this type of cost-
recovery rule. Electric prices are not impacted whether a first-seller or load-based
approach is chosen, but on whether permits are given away for free or charged for, and to
whom they are offered. If LSE's are the points of regulation and are required to hold
allowances, then LSE's will pass on the cost of Allowances to the consumers. If in-state
generators and electricity importers are the points of regulation, then they pass on the cost
of Allowances to the LSE's, who in turn pass it on to the consumers.
Allowance Distribution
The method of initial allowance distribution, impact's the prices but does not impact the
environmental outcome. The MAC recommends that the allowances be distributed in a
manner consistent with fundamental objectives of cost-effectiveness, fairness and
simplicity. In other words auction off the Allowances. However, the Committee feels that
several factors weigh in favor of starting with distribution of some allowances for free
and eventually transitioning to a full auction. The key advantages of auctioning over
allocation are that firstly, auctioning more effectively avoids windfall profits and perverse
incentives. Secondly auction revenues can be used more directly and more transparently
to advance program goals. Thirdly auctioning treats new entrants and existing emitters on
a level playing field, and finally, auctioning avoids the challenges of designing a fair free
distribution. However, there is no experience to draw from, since none of the previous
emissions trading programs have used auction a 100%. Engaging in auctions impact the
cash flow of regulated entities, and this could be challenging especially at the beginning
of the program. Required upfront payments for allowances, may contribute to the
alteration of an entities capital structure, reducing capital efficiency for the entity. The
idea of auctioning seems to have come from the practice of auctioning Treasuries, radio
spectrum, etc.
An entities investment in early action needs to be recognized rather than penalized. If
allowances are given away for free, then early action would entail receipt of fewer
allowances than business-as-usual. Acting after the fact would free up more allowances
to sell, and hence a windfall for a non-early actor. Hence most entities would wait till the
last minute, at the point that they find out that they are roped into the Cap-and-Trade
system, to make any investments in emission reductions. To encourage early action the
MAC recommends granting the entities offset allowances for reductions made in periods
prior to their inclusion in the Cap-and-Trade system, and employ direct financial
incentives with tighter regulatory policies outside the Cap-and-Trade system. However
granting offsets raises the issue of 'additionality' hence the MAC recommends
employing direct financial incentives.
Encouraging emissions reductions amongst entities not covered by the Cap-and-Trade
program, offsets (see Appendix) broaden the reach of the program and helps promote the
goal of overall emission reductions at the lowest cost. Offset's are subject to the scrutiny
of the principle of additionality (see Appendix) and exclusive ownership. California
needs to develop and implement a credible offset program that establishes accurate and
rigorous baselines in addition to adopting strong monitoring and verification
requirements, for both in-state and out-of-state generated offsets. Since there is an
inherent risk to an offset project, i.e. the small probability of not generating actual
reductions, the offsets need to be backed by guarantees if they are to be reversed. In the
absence of such a guarantee, the MAC recommends an application of an appropriate
discount factor for use of offset credits, and a quantity limit to the number of offsets that
should be absorbed
Uncertainties about cost and timing in the adoption of new, low-carbon technologies
create the potential for high or volatile allowance prices under the Cap-and-Trade
program. High prices can cause economic hardship, while price volatility creates
uncertainty for investments in emission reductions and reduces market confidence. One
way of fixing the high and volatile prices, is by allowing for intertemporal trading of
Allowances. Borrowing and Banking are the two main forms of intertemporal Allowance
trading. Since Borrowing creates the risk that borrowed allowances may not be recouped,
Borrowing is not recommended. Banking allows entities to over-comply in the early
phase, thereby improving environmental performance earlier, and allowing the
allowances to be saved for surrender in future compliance periods. Hence unlimited
banking is supported.
The length of the compliance period can neither be too short or too long. The length of
the compliance period affects intertemporal flexibility. A short compliance period, say
one year, would not let the covered entities to smooth emission fluctuations due to
changes in a number of variables, e.g. weather, market conditions, etc. A long
compliance period would not provide regular assurance that emission targets are being
met, since the true-ups (see Appendix) would be spread apart too far. The MAC has
recommended a compliance period of approximately three years in length, to balance the
goals of flexibility and environmental integrity. This means that at the end of every three
years, compliance would be assessed, by comparing emissions against Allowances held.
The recommended emissions reporting period is at the end of every quarter for large
sources and at least annually for the remaining entities.
The Safety Valve mechanism is not recommended, since the MAC has determined that
the various difficulties and challenges posed by a safety valve outweigh the potential
attractions. Having the safety valve firstly compromises one of the major attractions of
the Cap-and-Trade program which is the certainty that total emissions are always going
to be kept within the cap, and secondly causes linkage problems with other Cap-and-
Trade programs. While a safety valve establishes a ceiling on the Allowance price,
having a floor for the Allowance price has been recommended. The price floor would be
enforced by purchasing allowances and removing them from circulation, whenever the
floor price was reached. Another way of enforcing the floor price would be to institute a
reservation (or floor) price in any auction for emission allowances. Since the price floor,
contrary to the safety valve, would enhance environmental integrity and also signal to
investors that emission prices would never fall below a certain level, protecting their
return on investments in low carbon technology, the price floor has been recommended.
Another cost-containment mechanism that has been mentioned is the circuit-breaker.
The circuit breaker delays or cancels a scheduled deadline in the emissions cap. The
circuit breaker may reduce the Allowance price, but provides neither price nor quantity
certainty for covered entities, and does not ensure environmental integrity.
Penalties for non-compliance, may take the form of the NOx program, where a shortfall
of an Allowance requires making up with an Allowance to cover the shortfall plus two
additional Allowances as penalty. Hence the non-compliant entity has to come up with
three Allowances for each Allowance worth of non-compliance. Other systems like the
S02 and the EU ETS apply financial penalties rather than in-kind penalties. Civil and
Criminal penalties are also recommended to ward of continuous non-compliance.
Chapter 3 : Methods
This chapter captures the key points and parameters set by CARB in the design of the
California Cap-and-Trade system.
Between the two options, Option A or Option B, it is practical to start with Option A
rather than Option B. Option B although an excellent and the best choice, requires a new
and sophisticated infrastructure to be put in place, before emission caps can be applied,
monitored and reported. This new and sophisticated infrastructure will require new
technologies and billions of dollars in cost. Option A, which consists of three program
designs, allows the state to begin right away with Program Design 1. Implementation of
Program Design 1 requires existing infrastructure and resources, without having to
indulge in new monitoring and reporting technologies or related costs. Another benefit is
that in parallel, infrastructure can be put into place to transition to Program Design 2 and
then Program Design 3, while at the same time leveraging the additional learnings as the
program progresses.
450 entities are covered by Option A, Program Design 1. They account for 39% or 192.6
MMT (Million Metric Tonnes) of CO2 equivalent GHGE. These 450 entities individually
generate more than 10,000 MT's (Metric Tonnes) of CO2 equivalent GHGE's per year.
The 450 entities covered by Program 1 include the electricity sector ( in-state and
imported generation) and other industrial sources. Looking through California's
Environmental Database, we have identified 278 such Electric entities (See Appendix for
the plants, fuel source type, owners, MW installed etc.) that generate in excess of 10,000
MT of GHGE individually, and cumulatively generate approximately 98MMT of GHGE.
We assume that the remaining 172 (450-278) entities are the industrial sources that
generate the balance 94 (192-98) MMT of GHGE.
The compliance period is set equal to three years. We make the assumption, that since the
recommendations are made in July of 2007, and that it takes a little bit of time to decide
and implement a policy, and since that no policy is implemented as of May 2008 that the
policy will first see implementation in 2009. Working back from year 2020, which is our
target for 1990 levels of compliance, we conclude there will be four compliance periods,
as shown in the table below, which also fits in with our earlier assumption of the policy
being implemented from 2009. See table below.
Compliance Period Years included
1 2009 2010 2011
2 2012 2013 2014
3 2015 2016 2017
4 2018 2019 2020
Table 1 : Compliance Periods for Option A of California's Cap-and-Trade System
The estimated Business-As-Usual (BAU) GHGE emissions for year 2020 is 601 MMT,
and the actual emissions for year 1990 is 427 MMT.
Using emissions data from the CARB site, and assuming the above compliance periods,
and using the strategy of stabilizing the emissions during the first compliance period,
called the 'hold' strategy and then actively reduce the emissions over period 2, 3 and 4,
we calculate the emissions cap and per period required reductions, as shown in the
following table. For more details see the Appendix.
Compliance Period 1 2 3 4
Total estimated BAU GHGe 1576 1644 1712 1780
Total estimated Cap GHGe 1553.25 1492.48 1401.33 1310.18
Per Period reductions 22.65 128.72 159.10 159.10
Table 2 : Total Greenhouse gas reductions under our assumed compliance trajectory
Since we are focused on the Electric sector and the abatements by this sector, and given
that from above, that the amount of emissions by the electric sector and the industrial
sources are close enough, 98MMT and 94MMT, we make the assumption that the 278
electric entities will provide half, 20% of the 39%, of the required per-period reductions,
for Option A , Program Design 1.
The 450 entities, that produce 39% (192.6MMT) of the total GHGE, will be responsible
for providing the 22.65MMT of reductions, to stay on the above compliance trajectory. In
other words the cap is set to 11.76% (22.65/192.6) for these entities of which the 278
electric entities would be responsible for a reduction of 11.61 (22.65*20/39) MMT or
6.02%.
Abatement curves and their variation across power plants are key to the success of the
Cap-and-Trade system. No reliable data is available regarding abatement curves, and at
this time we will have to model this parameter. Abatement curves vary considerably
between entities, because of the type of technology, the utilization model, the age of
equipment etc. Even if two plants are similar in technology and size, other attributes such
as man-power, financial situation, company strategy, etc, cause differences in the
abatement curves of similar plants. Some plants may achieve abatement earlier while
others later and in a different compliance period. Due to insufficient data we will model
this parameter.
Allowance distribution is to be a mixture of giving some away for free and auctioning the
rest. What percentage should be given away for free? do entities get free allowances pari-
passu? and the amount to be auctioned off has not been clearly specified. Insufficient data
exists regarding the above hybrid mix of allowance distribution and this needs to be
modeled.
Unlimited banking of allowances is recommended. There is insufficient data on the
impact of unlimited banking to the Cap-and-Trade system. Borrowing on the other hand
is not recommended. If an entity under performs with respect to its emission obligations,
and cannot come up with the requisite allowances to cover the gap at true-up time, then
penalties will apply. The penalty recommended is three allowances for every allowance
exceeding the cap.
A safety valve is not recommended but instead enforcement of a price floor is
recommended. The reservation or floor price would be the price of the allowance at the
auction.
Finally, the California Cap-and-Trade system is designed to address the following two
issues: Environmental Integrity and Cost-Effective emission reductions.
I have modeled a Cap-and-Trade system using as much data that is available from the
state of California. The goal of the model is to understand the degree of control that a
regulator can have in achieving the twin goals of Environmental Integrity and cost-
effective emission reductions based on the recommendations of the MAC to CARB.
Description of the Model:
Data from the CARB site identified 900+ electric supply companies for California, with
data on their MW installed capacity.
The first step is to identify how much Green House Gases (GHG) are emitted by these
entities. We know that this number should be roughly 28%, the amount attributed to the
Electricity sector, of the total GHG emitted by the state of California (See Figure 2)
We calculate the MWh per year by multiplying the installed capacity in MW * 24 hours *
360 days per year. The assumption here is that the equivalent of five days a year is
scheduled for maintenance. The average carbon intensity of electric consumed in
California is 9301bs/MWh of C02 GHGE equivalence. (Page 41, Recommendations of
GHG C&T sys for Cali). Multiplying the total MWh/year * 9301bs/MWh * lbtoMT
scaler; gives the total amount of average GHG emissions emitted per year by each
electric entity in Metric Tonnes (MT). After calculating this value for each entity, and
since our interest is in Option A, Program Design 1, which covers GHG producing
entities that generate GHG over 10,000 Metric Tonnes, we filter out the entities on this
criteria and are left with 278 Electric entities, that generate approximately about 98 MMT
of GHG's.
Since these GHGE numbers are for year 2004. I then calculated a scale factor to scale the
year 2004 numbers to years 2009, 2010 and 2011. I did this by dividing the GHGE's for
these years by the GHGE for year 2004. For example the estimated GHGE for year 2009
is 518MMT, whereas the GHGE for year 2004 is 480MMT. Hence my scale factor for
year 2009 is 1.079167, which is the result of 518 divided by 480.
I then used the scale factors to calculate the GHG emissions for each of the 278 entries
for the years in compliance period 1. Now I can apply the 'hold' strategy to these entities
with these calculated numbers. As discussed before, with the "hold' strategy the 278
electric entities would be responsible for a reduction of 11.61 (22.65*20/39) MMT or
6.02% of abatement.
I then defined a headroom parameter, which specifies the minimum and maximum value
across all entities. The headroom is a projected value, defined as the amount of abatement
possible by an entity. The assumption is that across the industry (i.e. all electric entities),
it is possible for any entity to achieve a maximum amount of abatement, given infinite
time and costs, and that no entity will not be able to make a certain minimum amount of
abatement. These two values are captured as maximum and minimum headroom
parameters, and can be varied. For example, based on the experience with the industry it
may vary widely initially, say 20% to 50%, and as abatements are made, in the later
years/compliance periods, this could vary from 2% to 10%. The regulator would program
this variable based on their current findings in the industry. The model assumes that the
headroom is normally distributed, and the headroom is then calculated for each entity.
Since there are three years within the compliance period, the model assumes that the
abatement method, discovered or invented, can happen in any one of the three years and
that once the abatement method is installed it will continue to provide abatement in the
subsequent years. The model assumes that an entity will have made at least one
abatement discovery or application during the compliance period. No entity will have
made zero abatement. The model also assumes that no more than one abatement
discovery or invention is made in the same compliance period.
Actual abatement done is computed by assuming a normal distribution, which can be any
amount from zero to the headroom being the upper limit. An entity may not be able to
find an abatement solution, even though it thinks it could, or the solution may just not be
ready, or installing the solution may take more time and effort than originally planned.
Or, it just maybe that the solution is currently too expensive, and a cheaper way out
would be buy allowances in the open market. Hence it is reasonable to allow an entity to
make no actual abatements. While it is possible for entities to have made significant
breakthrough's and exceed their initial expectation of the size of the abatement possible.
i.e. exceed their headroom projections, the model does not allow for this and clamps the
maximum possible actual abatement to the headroom level. The actual abatement for
each of the years is calculated, and then summed up to provide a cumulative value at the
end of the compliance period. Similar companies that have their abatements applied in
different years may have differing cumulative abatements.
The Regulator provides the cap for the compliance period as a control parameter. The
model uses this parameter and calculates the cap on the business as usual values for the
compliance period, per entity. The model then compares the cumulative abatement
against the cap. If the cumulative abatement is lower than the desired abatement (the cap)
then the entity has a shortfall in its abatement obligations and has to go to the open
market to buy allowances. This means the entity is forced to take part in the 'trade' part
of the Cap-and-Trade system. The model then calculates the number of entities that are
forced into the trading system. The entities that made abatements exceeding the cap, have
excess allowances. These entities may choose to trade, or they may choose to bank their
excess allowances. Since California allows for unlimited banking there is no limit to how
many allowances may be banked.
The model provides feedback on the percentage abatement below cap, the number of
entities that would be forced into the trading system, the number of entities that may bank
their excess allowances and how many allowances in penalties the state of California
would gain. In essence by setting the cap, and having an understanding of the headroom
that the entities have, and estimating the entities ability to make abatement changes to
realize actual GHGE reductions, the regulator can move the industry to an optimal point
where the difference between cap and actual abatement is optimal and the number of
entities forced into trading hovers around 50% (This is so that there is no buyers market
or sellers market induced).
A breakdown of the 278 Electric Entities reveals the following table. There are 67 entities
that spew out less than 50,000 Metric Tonnes of GHG emissions, and 28 that spew out
between 1 Million to 3 Million Metric Tonnes.

















Table 3 : Distribution of CA Electric Entities by GHG emissions (2004)
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Fig 6 : Distribution of California's Electric Entities by GHGE produced for year 2004
Total
Chapter 4: Results, Analysis and Conclusions
I have modeled various scenarios, to understand how this model can be used to discover
the optimal cap for a given set of data that can be got from the Electric Entities.
An electric entity would have a fair idea of the maximum possible abatement it can make.
If this data was gathered from every entity, some would be capable of more abatement
than others. Hence we would have the largest maximum value and the smallest maximum
value. We call this maximum headroom and minimum headroom in our model.
For a given amount of headroom, the entity could provide data as to how much %
abatement they would be able to achieve within the compliance period, and possibly in
which year within the compliance period.
Keeping the headroom values static and running the model a 1000 times over in which
we vary the cap in steps of 0.5%, from 0% to 10%, we get the following results that are
graphed.
We graph the difference between the cap and the actual abatement versus the % cap set.
The optimal point is when the cap is set between 7% and 7.5%. We also graph the
number of entities forced to trade in the trading scheme based on the % cap set. The
optimal point occurs when the cap is set between 5% and 6%.
The regulator could then give weightage to either the environmental integrity at which
the abatement is almost equal to the cap, as in somewhere in the 7% range, or give
weightage to cost effective emission reductions, or an optimal point in between.
However we know that to follow our "hold" strategy we need to have an abatement of
6.02%, and the regulator, in this scenario, has the flexibility to pick this cap % number.
Cap in % for Compliance Diff (Cap-Actual) abatement # Entities forced to take part






















Table 4: Variations in Abatement Shortfall and # Entities trading for step changes in cap %












Figure 6 : Variations in Abatement Shortfall for step changes of 0.5% in cap %'s
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Figure 7 : Variations in # Electric entities trading, for step changes of 0.5% in cap %'s
Another scenario to consider would be to use the model in determining how the variation
in actual abatement capability could affect meeting the cap, and impact the number of
entities drawn into the trading scheme, given that the Headroom data is known and is
static. I have modeled this scenario at 5%, 6% and 7% cap, to show and discuss the
differences. Since our interest hangs around 6.02%, I picked a percentage point on either
side.
At 5% Cap :
From the following graph that given a static headroom (kept same as the above case), and
allowing for a random distribution of Entities ability to make changes within random
years of the compliance period shows that if the cap is set at 5% then more often than not
the industry (comprising of the 278 entities) would come up with excess abatements with
the most likely excessive abatement of about 4 MMT. At the same time there would most
likely be 134 entities that would come up short in meeting their cap, leaving 144 entities
that would meet the cap, or almost an equal number of buyers and sellers.








Figure 8 : Distribution of the difference, of GHGE, between Cap (5%) and Actual Abatement in
MMT
The negative numbers mean that the actual abatement is larger than the Cap value.
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Table 5 : GHGE difference (Cap - Actual Abatement) in
Probability

































Figure 9 : # Electric entities forced to trade at a 5% Cap level
# Electric entities
at 5% cap level
forced to trade














































If the cap is set at 6% then more often than not the industry (comprising of the 278
entities) would come up with an excess of 1.25 MMT of abatement. At the same time
there would most likely be 154 entities that would come up short in meeting their cap,
leaving 122 entities that would meet or exceed the cap. Hence the trading market would
be a good thriving market. There are fewer sellers than buyers, and it may seem that
sellers could manipulate price to their advantage, but sellers have more to sell. Hence this
is a pretty much balanced scenario.
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Figure 10 : Distribution of the difference, of GHGE, between Cap (6%) and Actual Abatement
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At 7% Cap:
From the following graph that given a static headroom (kept same as the above case), and
allowing for a random distribution of Entities ability to make changes within random
years of the compliance period shows that if the cap is set at 7% then more often than not
the industry (comprising of the 278 entities) would come up short with the most likely
shortfall of about 1.5 MMT. At the same time there would most likely be 172 entities that
would come up short in meeting their cap, leaving 106 entities that would meet the cap.
Hence the trading market would be skewed in favor of the sellers, and become even more
skewed if some of the sellers decided to bank their excess allowances. With penalties
three times the price of an allowance, another premium would be added to the market
price of the allowance in favor of the sellers.
Figure 12 : Distribution of the difference, of GHGE, between Cap (7%) and Actual Abatement
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Table 9 : GHGE difference (Cap - Actual Abatement) in MMT's at 7% Cap












Figure 13 : Distribution
# Electric entities
at 7% cap level















































forced to trade at the 7% Cap level
From the Cap set at the three different Cap levels and fixing the headroom, and
examining how entities would be able to achieve the desired abatement, it becomes clear
that the 5% cap makes it a buyers market, since there are fewer buyers and there is an
excess of abated allowances. On the other hand setting the cap at 7%, reverses the above
scenario. In this case there is a shortage of allowances, and there are many more buyers,
making it a sellers market. The happy medium seems to be when the cap is set to 6%,
where there is slight excess of abated allowance, but also a larger number of buyers.
In conclusion the model can be used to simulate the kind and amount of control a
regulator has, in regulating the market in terms of both cap and trade, to offer the
optimum environmental benefit and abatement at least cost.
Chapter 5 : Recommendations
The first issue with the current form of the Cap-and-Trade system is that the government
has put itself in the midst of a market. This is not the ordinary case of the government
auctioning off a public resource, as in treasury bills or a radio frequency spectrum and
walking away. Tied to the hip, after the auction is done or the give-away completed, is
the matter of meeting an obligation.
Second, the revenues collected by the government from the auction are to be deployed by
the government for investment in clean and other low-carbon technologies. This money
could be collected via a carbon tax, so why need the Cap-and-Trade system? besides does
the government really knew how to invest in new cool technologies? This is similar to the
direct regulation issue, where the government tells an entity the technology or process to
use.
Third, a long Compliance period length is chosen so as to enhance the trading volume.
Fourth, long compliance periods tend to make the caps feel like they occur in large steps,
and can have a major impact on an entity's cash flow. Since the cap sizes between
compliance periods have a larger swing, so will the buying and selling quantities, causing
volatility in prices close to the finish line.
Fifth, having the safety valve firstly compromises one of the major attractions of the Cap-
and-Trade program which is the certainty that total emissions are always going to be kept
within the cap, and also causing linkage problems with other Cap-and-Trade programs
Sixth, Offsets are not used to their full extent, and the government is the major source of
pollution rights. Offsets are allowed to be non-technology based.
Seventh, Investors need to feel confident that their returns are protected and not wiped
out. This is done with government intervention during price spikes or high price
volatility.
Eighth, government determines whether to charge or not charge the entity for the
allowance. This price cannot be known, ahead of time or calculated; hence the electric
prices could be very volatile.
My recommendations to fix the gaps in the Cap-and-Trade System
To fix the above issues, I am proposing a Modified Cap-and-Trade system (MCAT).
This system does not drive fear driven entities to push for banking. Banking if done will
be done by the government, and banking means a better environmental outcome, that can
be used by all entities. The system does not require the government to step in with a
Safety valve. This method is more of a continuous method that places less stress on a
company's cash flow, by reducing the cash spike associated with buying Allowances all
at once.
1. No Banking by entities, but banking by issuer
2. No Safety Valve
3. Method impacts not only prices but the environmental outcome
The Government
The government does not auction Allowances neither does it give away 'gratis'
Allowances. Instead the government gives call option's to covered entities, to buy
emission Allowances from the government at a Strike price that is particular to the entity
that is given the call option.
Cost of Call option
For now let's assume that the government gives away the call option for free to the entity.
Life of Tradable Allowance
The emission Allowances purchased by the firm are good for a 'life-period'. A 'life-
period' is a period of time that is specified on the emission Allowances, and indicates the
period during which this Allowance can be used or traded. Once the 'life-period' is up,
the emission Allowance 'expires'. The emission Allowances purchased by the firm, to be
used/traded in the current life-period can only be purchased within the previous life-
period. This is an important restriction. For e.g. using one month as the life-period,
tradable emissions Allowances valid for the month of May, can only be purchased in the
month of April. At the end of May these tradable Allowances expire.
Expiration of Tradable Allowance
Expiration means that the tradable Allowances are returned to the issuer at a highly
discounted price or for free. Expiration also means that the firm that paid for the tradable
emission Allowance has lost money from its purchase, and can only salvage the
discounted amount as set by the issuer. For the issuer or regulator in the current case it
means that the regulator has banked the emissions that were not emitted (or used). The
regulator or issuer is free to set the salvage price to none, some, or the issuance price.
Compliance Window
The compliance window is set to the life-period of the tradable Allowance.
Call option availability and exercise
The call option is made available once beginning each life-period, and is exercisable at
any time during the life-period, but can be exercised only once during the period. The call
option expires at the end of the life-period. A new call option is made available in the
next period, but now the strike price is a recalculated new Strike price.
Number of Tradable Allowances that can be purchased by the call option
The number of tradable emission Allowances that can be bought by a firm using the call
option is dependent on the number of firms in the mix for the life-period concerned and
the cap for that period. The issuer or regulator adds the requests for tradable emission
Allowances and allocates them pro-rata relative to the cap for that period, to each
requesting firm. Firms have to be careful in the amount of requested tradable allowances.
If they ask for too few, and are allocated the few or fewer, means they have to go and buy
additional Allowances from the market. If on the other hand the firms ask for too many or
more than they can use, and are allocated that many, then they are up against the life-
period clock. They will have to either sell these allowances before the life-period is
reached or may have to forfeit the extra allowances, claiming the set salvage value.
For the firms with excess Allowances, as they approach the end marker on the life-period,
the losses loom large and larger, due to potential forfeit. For firms with fewer Allowances
than necessary, as they approach the end marker of the life-period, the potential penalties
loom larger and larger. Hence the motivation to trade for either side is large. The value of
the trade, on the average, could be in the band, between the Strike price of the seller but
less than the penalty for the buyer. However this is not always the case. A nervous seller
may rush to sell and may accept an amount larger than salvage but below issuance price.
Strike Price for Tradable Allowances
The Strike price of the Allowance, for a specific entity is based on its emissions intensity,
i.e. C02 lbs per MWh. Because the Strike price is based on the emission rate, the
problem of rewarding or penalizing an early actor goes away. It is to the benefit of the
entity to get the dual benefit of lower Strike price and fewer required Allowances,
reducing its overall compliance costs, due to its investment in emission reductions.
Finally, the Cap and Trade system is a new idea that is being tested in the wider market.
More work needs to be done in building sophisticated models, that take into account real
world data. Marginal costs to entities and the trading band needs to be studied and
modeled. The impact of new discoveries and technology needs to be considered. The
variation in marginal costs amongst entities needs to be considered. There is plenty of
future work to be done!
Appendix
A.1 Additional Program Designs
Program 2 - Program 1 plus upstream coverage of C02 emissions from
Transportation:
* Scope: Includes Program 1 entities Plus C02 emissions from the combustion of
gasoline and diesel in the transportation sector.
* Points of regulation: Points el and e2 as in Program 1, Plus point c2 in Fig 3.
* Extent of coverage: The inclusion of C02 emissions from gasoline and diesel use
expands the coverage from 39% as in Program 1 to 72% of California Greenhouse
gas emissions.
* Administrative considerations: Program 2 adds an administrative infrastructure
cost. Program 2 requires California to create a system to monitor the amount of
carbon sold by refiners and importers in the form of gasoline and diesel fuel.
There are approximately, only 30 such entities in the state.
* Implementation: Program 2 augments Program 1 by including the road
transportation sector. The transportation sector is not currently part of any Cap-
and-Trade system, and additional work is required to identify specific points of
regulation, develop measurement and reporting protocols and sort out the
regulatory roles and responsibilities of industry and government officials. The
benefit of adding the transport sector is that it increases the scope, lower cost s
and offers greater market liquidity.
Program 3 - Program 2 plus upstream coverage of Fossil fuel combustion by other
sectors:
* Scope: Includes Program 1 and Program 2 entities Plus upstream coverage of
C02 emissions from fossil fuel combustion at residential and small
industrial/commercial facilities.
* Points of regulation: Points el and e2 as in Program 1, Point c2 as in Program 2
Plus point c3 in Fig 3.
* Extent of coverage: Residential use of fossil fuels accounts for 6% of California's
GHG emissions. Small industrial/commercial facilities account for 5% of
California's GHG emissions. Program 3 expands the coverage from 72% to 83%.
* Administrative considerations: Program 3 adds an administrative infrastructure
cost. In addition to the Program 2 administrative requirements, Program 3
requires a new monitoring and reporting system to include local and natural gas
distribution companies. There are 10 such entities in the state.
* Implementation: Program 3 broadens the scope of Program 2 by adding in the fuel
consumption/emissions of residential and industrial/commercial facilities.
Additional work is required to ensure that fuel used by these sectors is accurately
measured and reported. Points of regulation, protocols for measuring and
reporting fuel carbon content, avoidance of double counting and selection of
responsible individuals at natural gas companies is required. The agency or
agencies in charge of this part of the program needs to be setup or identified.
Program 4 - Upstream coverage of C02 from fossil fuel combustion and
downstream coverage of large sources of non-C02 gases and some suppliers of high-
GWP gases:
* Scope: Includes Program 1,2 and 3 entities Plus ALL C02 emissions from the
combustion of fossil fuels. It also includes industrial process emissions, high
GWP gases and electricity imports.
* Points of regulation: Natural gas delivery point cl and gasoline and diesel supply
point c2 for C02 emissions from in-state combustion. Industrial process sources,
supply of high GWP gases and electricity imports for other emissions.
* Extent of coverage: Similar to Program 3, program 4 would cover 83% of
California's GHG emissions.
* Administrative considerations: Program 4 adds the most administrative
infrastructure costs. Similar to Program 3, Program 4 requires the development of
a monitoring and reporting system to track all fossil fuels produced in or imported
into California. This includes all natural gas processing plants, the state's seven
interstate natural gas pipelines, and pipelines from Mexico. As with Program 3,
Program 4 too has no precedent for using this approach in a Cap-and-Trade
system run by a single agency.
* Implementation: Program 4 achieves the same coverage as Program 3 but by
moving the point of regulation upstream and thus having to cover fewer entities.
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A.3 Cap Trajectory for GHG emissions to 2020
Modeling the Reductions
From data obtained at California's CARB website,
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/ccei/inventory/tables/rpt inventory ipcc sum 2007-11-19.pdf
the following table shows the actual net emissions, by year, for the state of California.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
410 412 409 422 411




1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
444 451 452 469 464
from year 1990 to 2004 in MMT
Estimated BAU emissions for year 2020 from the California report is 600.8 MMT
Assuming a straight line increase, from 2004 through 2020, the average rate of increase
in Greenhouse gas emissions is approximately 7.55MMT/year. The estimated values are





12 : Projected BAU
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
422 411 409 428 444 451 452 469 464
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
518 525 533 540 548 556 563 571 578











Since Option A, consists of implementation of Program Design 1, followed by
implementation of Program Design 2 and then followed by Program Design 3, we assume
that Program Design 1 is implemented in the first Compliance Period, followed by
Program Design 2 in the second and third Compliance periods, followed by Program
Design 3 in the fourth Compliance period.
We suggest that compliance trajectory is as follows. During Compliance period 1, we put
a stop to the growth of Greenhouse gas emissions. During Compliance periods 2, 3 and 4,
we drive down (negative growth) Greenhouse gas emissions.
Hence we assume that for Compliance period 1, that the Greenhouse Cap will be
maintained constant at 2009 levels. For Compliance periods 2, 3 and 4, the average Cap
decline will be set to 10.13 MMT/year, so that year 2020 Greenhouse gas emission levels
are the same as 1990 Greenhouse gas emission levels. See table and chart.
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
480 488 495 503 510 518 518 518 508 497 487 477
Table 13 : Projected Greenhouse Gas Cap levels from year 2009 to 2020 in MMT
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
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Figure 14 : Chart showing Option A Greenhouse gas emission levels for Business as Usual and Cap
We now calculate the per period reductions across the board for the state of California,
under our assumption that Greenhouse gas is contained and not allowed to grow in
Compliance period 1 and then aggressively reduced in the remaining Compliance
periods. See following table.
Compliance Period 1
Total estimated BAU GHGe 1576
Total estimated Cap GHGe 1553.25
Per Period reductions 22.65





under our assumed compliance trajectory
We assume that the percentage contributions of each of the Greenhouse gas contributing
sectors does not vary and stays constant within the compliance period.
A.4 Definitions
Additionality
Emission reductions achieved through a given project over and above those that would
have occurred in the absence of the project under the business-as-usual scenario.
Carbon Credits
One carbon credit (CC) gives the owner the right to emit one ton of carbon dioxide.
Carbon credits are a new financial instrument representing certified reductions in the
emission of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. Carbon Credits are the "currency" of
recently formed climate exchanges. Carbon credit is one particular form of ERC. When
a firm buys carbon credits, to cover its excess emissions, the carbon credit is deemed a
carbon offset.
Clean Technology
Technologies that are driven by market factors, appeal to investors, and 'clean' by
definition.
Coase's theorem
If transaction costs are zero, if, in other words, any agreement that is in the mutual benefit
of the parties concerned gets made, then any initial definition of property rights leads to
an efficient outcome.
Emission Reduction Credits
An Emission Reduction Credit (ERC) is a credit granted, upon request by an emission
source, who voluntarily reduces emissions beyond required levels of control. An ERC
represents the legal ability to emit regulated pollutants in an amount equal to the quantity
specified when the ERC was granted. ERCs may be sold, leased, banked for future use,
or traded in accordance with applicable regulations established by SWCAA. ERCs are
intended to provide an incentive for reducing emissions below required levels, and to
establish a framework to promote a market based approach to air pollution control.
Green Technology
Environmental-type issues--the 'end of the smokestack tech' technologies that tend to be
driven by regulations.
LSE
Load Serving Entities are California companies that purchase electricity in the wholesale
power market and deliver it to California customers.
MWh
Mega Watt hour, is an energy measure, and is the generation of 1000,000 Watts for one
hour.
NERC E-tags
North American Electric Reliability Council E-tags are used to track the transmission of
electricity so that sources of grid congestion may be more easily identified and mitigated.
Along with other information, the E-tag identifies the source and destination control
region and thus could be used to assign average emissions intensity to electricity
transmitted into California as part of a specific transaction.
Offset
An offset is a credit for emissions reductions achieved by an entity in a sector that is not
covered by a given Cap-and-Trade system.
Offset Projects
Offset Projects are registered and certified projects, that reduce greenhouse (GHG) gases
using existing technologies in order to promote sustainable farming while simultaneously
creating tradable Carbon Credits. An Offset Provider is an owner of an offset project or
projects that registers those offsets directly on the exchange, and sells offsets on its own
behalf. An Offset Aggregator is an entity that serves as the administrative representative,
on behalf of offset project owners, of multiple offset-generating projects.
Ownership
Ownership constitutes of
1. The set of rights to use property in certain ways and a set of negative rights that
prevents its use in other ways,
2. The right to prevent others from exercising those rights, or to set the terms on
which others may exercise them, and
3. The right to sell your property rights
Pecuniary Externality
A pecuniary externality is a special type of externality that imposes no net cost, since the
effects on other people cancel out. Unlike other externalities the actor's private net costs
are equal to total net costs, just as if there would be no externality at all. A pecuniary
externality does not lead to inefficiency.
Renewable Energy Credit
One Renewable Energy Credit or "REC" represents one megawatt hour (MWh) of
renewable energy that is physically metered and verified from the generator, or
the renewable energy project.. The green-power (electricity) is sold into the local electric
grid where the renewable energy project is located. The REC's are sold separately as a
commodity into the marketplace. In a REC deal, the power from the new renewable
energy facility is not physically delivered to the customer, but the environmental benefits
created by the facility are attributed to that customer, directly offsetting the
environmental impact of the customer's conventional energy use.
True-Up
The submission, at the end of each compliance period by entities, of sufficient allowances
to validate the actual emissions during the compliance period, is called a true-up.
Waste
Waste is something without value that no one will either pay for, or accept as a gift.
Weather derivatives
Weather insurance/derivatives are perceived to be evolving products with the highest
degree of commercial promise for application in the renewable energy sector. In general,
weather derivatives cover low-risk, high-probability events. Weather insurance, on the
other hand, typically covers high-risk, low-probability events, as defined in a highly
tailored, or customized, policy. For example, a company might use a weather derivative
to hedge against a winter that forecasters think will be 5' F warmer than the historical
average (a low-risk, high-probability event). In this case, the company knows its revenues
would be affected by that kind of weather. But the same company would most likely
purchase an insurance policy for protection against damages caused by a flood or
hurricane (high-risk, low-probability events).
Welfare damage
Welfare Damage is measured as the monetary equivalent, of the reduction in welfare,
resulting from pollution damage that is NOT prevented. For e.g. a native of Los Angeles,
born and raised there, may move out of LA, to avoid breathing the smog, and breathe the
same fresh/quality of air of his/her younger days, elsewhere. This may result in a lower
salary, at this new place.
A.5 Acronyms
CARB California Air Resources Board
CAT Climate Action Team
CCAR California Climate Action Registry
CEC California Energy commission
CPUC California Public Utilities Company
ERC Emissions Reduction Credit
GHGe Green House Gas emissions
GWP Global Warming Potential
MAC Market Advisory Committee
MWh Mega Watt Hour
NERC North American Electric Reliability Council
PUC Public Utility Commission
REC Renewable Energy Credit
WECC Western Electricity Coordinating Council
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